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HOW BIG MONEY RUINED PUBLIC LIFE IN
WISCONSIN
LYNN ADELMAN*
ABSTRACT
This Article discusses how Wisconsin fell from grace. Once a model good
government state that pioneered many democracy-enhancing laws, in a very short
time, Wisconsin became a state where special interest money, most of which is
undisclosed, dominates politics. This Article identifies several factors as being critical
to Wisconsin’s descent. These include the state’s failure to nurture and build on the
campaign finance reforms enacted in the 1970s and both the state’s and the United
States Supreme Court’s failure to adequately regulate sham issue ads. As evidence of
Wisconsin’s diminished status, this Article describes how several of the state’s most
progressive laws have been undermined and how each of the three branches of the
state’s government has been beset by scandal related to the increased importance of
special interest money. Finally, this Article suggests that major change will come
about only in the long term; such change will require both new campaign finance
reforms and a shift in approach by the United States Supreme Court.
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I. THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORMS ENACTED IN THE 1970S WORKED

From the standpoint of good government, Wisconsin was once a model state, often
in the forefront of governmental reform. During the era of Fighting Bob LaFollette,
Wisconsin pioneered a range of innovative democracy-enhancing measures, including
referendum, recall, direct election of United States senators, and campaign finance
reform legislation.1 In 1905, the Wisconsin legislature banned corporations from
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assistance.
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making financial contributions to political candidates.2 And in 1911, fourteen years
prior to the federal government, the Wisconsin legislature passed a Corrupt Practices
Act.3 The Act was a sweeping reform that barred political candidates from trading
favors for contributions and also required candidates to report the sources of their
campaign funding.4
By the early 1970s, the need for additional campaign finance reform legislation
became apparent.5 A reform movement commenced,6 fueled principally by the ideas
of John Gardner’s fledgling national organization, Common Cause.7 When news of
the Watergate scandal8 broke, the campaign finance reform effort gained traction.9
Beginning in 1973, over a period of four years, the Wisconsin legislature enacted
comprehensive campaign finance reform legislation.10 The reforms were based on the
following principles: (1) all political spending had to go through committees registered
with the newly created bi-partisan Elections Board, which was responsible for
administering the law; (2) contributions to candidate committees, political party
committees, and political action committees (“PACs”) had to be fully disclosed to the
public, as did expenditures for political purposes; (3) individuals and committees were
subject to contribution limits; and (4) a system of partial public financing of campaigns
was created with spending limits for participating candidates. 11

1 SUZANNE NOVAK & SHEEMA SHAH, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN
WISCONSIN
2
(2007),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_48578.pdf.
2

WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE
(2001).
3

OF

WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 2001–2002 894

Corrupt Practices Act, 1911 Wis. Sess. Laws 883.

4

CAROLE J. HYNEK, WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, WISCONSIN BRIEF 01-9, CAMPAIGN
FINANCING
IN
WISCONSIN
1
(2001),
http://lrbdigital.legis.wisconsin.gov/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16831coll2/id/1079/rec/4.
5

See id. at 1–2.

6

See id.

7 See Rebecca Curry, Making Law with Lawsuits: Understanding Judicial Review in
Campaign Finance Policy, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 389, 403–04 (2013).
8

“In May 1972, as evidence would later show, members of Nixon’s Committee to ReElect the President (known derisively as CREEP) broke into the Democratic National
Committee’s Watergate headquarters, stole copies of top-secret documents and bugged the
(2009),
office’s
phones.”
Watergate
Scandal,
HISTORY.COM
http://www.history.com/topics/watergate.
9 See generally Gail Shea, Musings on the Arc of Campaign Finance Reform 2 (n.d.)
(unpublished paper) (on file with author).
10

See Act of Oct. 20, 1977, ch. 107, § 44, 1977 Wis. Sess. Law 595, repealed by 2011
Wisconsin Act 32, § 13vb, 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 139; Act of July 6, 1974, ch. 334, § 34, 1973
Wis. Sess. Laws 1057, repealed and replaced by 2015 Wisconsin Act 117, § 24, 2015 Wis.
Sess. Laws 836.
11

See Act of Oct. 20, 1977, ch. 107, § 44 (creating partial public financing for political
campaigns); Act of July 6, 1974, ch. 334, § 34.
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The purpose of the legislation was to limit the influence of money in electoral
politics. The rationale was that the more candidates had to worry about raising large
amounts of money to secure an election, the more likely the decisions they made once
in office would be influenced by the sources of their financial support as opposed to
the public interest. As the statute’s declaration of policy stated: “When the true source
of support or extent of support is not fully disclosed, or when a candidate becomes
overly dependent upon large private contributors, the democratic process is subjected
to a potential corrupting influence.”12
The same concern served as the basis for the statute’s public funding provisions.
The notion was that if candidates could fund their campaigns through a combination
of small contributions and public grants, they would be less likely to be beholden to
private interests while in office.13 The Wisconsin legislature thus recognized that in a
democratic society, a systemic tension exists between the interests of the majority and
the interests of the rich and powerful. The question was how to create a healthy balance
between these interests; on one hand, the power of the majority could be used unfairly
against those with substantial financial resources. On the other hand, the wealthy could
use their money to dominate governmental decision-making.14 Therefore, creating
strong, democratic institutions was necessary to balance these competing interests.
Campaign finance regulation was thought to be one such institution.15
The public funding dimension of the reform legislation was designed to conform
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo in which the Court held that a
state legislature could impose spending limits on a political campaign only if it made
public funding available and the candidate accepted such funding. 16 Thus, the
legislature created the Wisconsin Elections Campaign Fund (“WECF”) to provide
public funding for candidates running for almost all state offices in contested general
elections.17 To be eligible for a public grant, a candidate had to raise a threshold
amount in contributions of $100 or less and receive at least 6% of the vote in the
primary election.18 Like the system used to finance presidential general election
campaigns, the WECF funds were generated through a checkoff on income tax returns;
individual taxpayers could indicate that $1 of their tax liability be directed to the
WECF.19

12

WIS. STAT. § 11.001 (2002).

13

WIS. STAT. § 11.01 (2014); PAUL ONSAGER, WIS. LEGIS. FISCAL BUREAU,
INFORMATIONAL PAPER 1, PUBLIC FINANCING OF CAMPAIGNS IN WISCONSIN 2 (2009),
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/informationalpapers/documents/2009/95_public%20financing%20of%20campaigns%20in%20wi_po.pdf.
14

See id.

15

Shea, supra note 9, at 1.

16

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 99 (1976).

17

1977 Wis. Sess. Laws at 595.

18 WIS. STAT. § 11.50 (2010); Kenneth R. Mayer & John M. Wood, The Impact of Public
Financing on Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from Wisconsin, 1964–1990, 20 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 69, 72 (1995).
19

1977 Wis. Sess. Laws at 599; Mayer & Wood, supra note 18, at 83.
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Candidates could obtain funds from the WECF equal to 45% of the spending limit
for the office they sought.20 Because the purpose of public funding was to reduce
candidate dependence on special interest contributions, the public grant was reduced
by a dollar for every dollar of PAC money a candidate accepted.21 To encourage
candidates to accept public funding, a candidate whose opponent declined public
funding was not required to abide by the statutory spending limits.22 Later, for the
same reason, the Wisconsin legislature added a provision that authorized a candidate
facing a non-participating opponent to receive the non-participating opponent’s public
grant.23
In addition to making it less likely that substantive issues such as education,
healthcare, and taxation would not be excessively influenced by moneyed interests,
public funding provided other benefits. For example, it helped ensure that citizens with
limited means could run for public office. Public funding also enabled elected officials
to spend more time focusing on substantive issues.24 Ultimately, however, the main
purpose of providing public funding to candidates was to reduce the nexus between
access to wealth and electoral success. As former Arizona governor Janet Napolitano
once explained, her executive order creating a discount prescription drug program was
directly connected to Arizona’s public funding system in that public funding made her
less concerned about the financial power of the pharmaceutical industry.25
For approximately a dozen years, Wisconsin’s campaign finance reform
legislation worked well. About 20% of Wisconsin taxpayers participated in the income
tax checkoff. As a result, the WECF had enough money to provide all participating
candidates with the full public grant of 45% of the spending limit.26 Further,
approximately three-fourths of all candidates participated in the public funding
system.27 This large-scale participation had a significant effect on overall campaign
spending.
The increase in campaign spending was much smaller in Wisconsin in the postreform years than it was in other states.28 Between 1978 and 1990, the average
spending by Wisconsin incumbents rose by a little more than 120% in senate races.29
Comparatively, in roughly the same period, spending in senate races rose in California
by 286%, in Oregon by 379%, and in Nebraska by 308%.30 Also, the gap between
incumbent and challenger spending remained relatively narrow, with Wisconsin

20

1977 Wis. Sess. Laws at 598; Mayer & Wood, supra note 18, at 73.

21

WIS. STAT. § 11.509 (2010).

22

Id. § 11.512.

23

Id. § 11.509; 2002 Wis. Sess. Laws 1022.

24

NOVAK & SHAH, supra note 1, at 4.

25

Id. at 6.

26

Mayer & Wood, supra note 18, at 79–80.

27

NOVAK & SHAH, supra note 1, at 14.

28

Mayer & Wood, supra note 18, at 73.

29

NOVAK & SHAH, supra note 1, at 14.

30

Mayer & Wood, supra note 18, at 79–80.
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challengers spending 70% to 80% of what incumbents spent, a far better record than
in other states.31
Additionally, the Wisconsin campaign finance reform legislation effectively
limited the role of special interest groups. In 1990, for example, PAC contributions
constituted only 13.5% of the total amount raised in legislative campaigns.32 In
contrast, in other states, such as Michigan and Oregon, interest groups accounted for
between 60% and 75% of legislative campaign contributions.33
The other features of the legislation also worked well. The disclosure provision
required candidates to disclose all “contributions in excess of $20, including the
occupation and employer of any contributor whose cumulative contributions for the
calendar year exceeded $100.”34 And while contribution limits for some elected offices
were relatively high, the Wisconsin legislature limited individual and PAC
contributions to $500 for state assembly candidates and $1000 for senate candidates.35
Further, leaders of both the Republican and Democratic parties appointed
individuals to the Elections Board who were committed to fair and nonpartisan
enforcement of the law.36 Thus, Wisconsin’s campaign finance reform legislation
succeeded in limiting the influence of special interest money in electoral politics. The
system created by the reform legislation also developed considerable bipartisan
support.37 Not incidentally, the years in which the system flourished were among the
most productive in state history; the Wisconsin legislature enacted important
legislation concerning a broad range of subjects.38
Therefore, the first lesson learned from Wisconsin’s experience is that campaign
finance reform legislation can work and accomplish its intended purposes. As
discussed, the law worked well and political actors and the press paid close attention
to it. Questionable conduct was brought to the attention of the Elections Board, and
the public was kept well-informed about campaign finance issues. Some
commentators cynically observe that campaign finance reform legislation must
inevitably fail because money will always find a way to influence politics.39 Yet
31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

NOVAK & SHAH, supra note 1, at 7; see WIS. STAT. § 11.06 (2010).

35

Novak & Shah, supra note 1, at 7.

36

See id. at 15.

37

Shea, supra note 9, at 2.

38

See 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws 725 (automobile lemon law); id. at 1153 (a groundbreaking
marital property law); 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 643 (creation of a Citizens Utility Board); id. at
901 (protection of gays and lesbians from discrimination in employment, housing and public
accommodation); id. at 1378 (substantial revisions to the state fair employment law); id. at 1387
(an open records law); 1977 Wis. Sess. Laws 412 (creation of the Public Defender’s Office); id.
at 567 (no fault divorce law); id. at 728 (creating a uniform classification system of criminal
offenses, including decriminalizing several offenses); id. at 1216 (lobbying reform); 1973 Wis.
Sess. Laws 186 (laws regarding a code of ethics for public officials).
39 Steve Gillman, Why Bother with Campaign Finance Reform?, HUFFPOST: THE BLOG
(Dec. 23, 2012 11:19 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-gillman/campaign-financereform_b_2001074.html.
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Wisconsin’s experience, as well as the experiences of many other jurisdictions, such
as New York City, demonstrates that a well-constructed system can produce good
results.40
II. BUT WISCONSIN FAILED TO NURTURE THE REFORMS
In the late 1980s and thereafter, Wisconsin’s positive experience with campaign
finance reform began to change. Partisanship intensified, and Elections Board
appointees focused more on protecting their party’s candidates than the public
interest.41 Even worse, Board members began to collude to thwart enforcement of the
law. For example, the Board stopped conducting random audits of campaign finance
reports and refused to require campaign committees to reconcile their financial reports
with bank statements.42 Without these checks on the veracity of campaign finance
reports, public disclosure essentially became voluntary. The Board also precluded its
staff from investigating complaints of law violations. In one instance, the Board
squashed a complaint against a committee claiming to be an independent entity
making lawful expenditures when that committee was actually a county political
party.43
The Wisconsin legislature also weakened contribution limits applicable to party
committees and PACs by allowing them to set up “conduits” that enabled them to
report interest group contributions as if they were from individuals. 44 In addition, the
legislature approved the establishment of leadership PACs, known as legislative
campaign committees. These committees quickly became vehicles for raising large
sums of special interest money.45
The legislature’s most serious error was its failure to support public funding. It did
not promote or increase the $1 income tax checkoff, and it did not designate another
source of public funding.46 As a result, the money in the WECF diminished, and the
40 See ELISABETH GENN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, DONOR DIVERSITY THROUGH
PUBLIC
MATCHING
FUNDS
6,
16
(2012),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/DonorDiversityReport_
WEB.PDF (describing the New York City small donor program); SUZANNE NOVAK & PAIGE
AMMONS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN MINNESOTA 4, 7 (2007),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_48578.pdf
[hereinafter CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN MINNESOTA]; SUZANNE NOVAK & LAUREN JONES, BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUSTICE,
CAMPAIGN
FINANCE
IN
MICHIGAN
4,
7
(2007),
http://www.mcfn.org/pdfs/reports/Brennan_MI_48220.pdf [hereinafter CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN
MICHIGAN]; SUZANNE NOVAK, MANEESH SHARMA & BETHAN FOSTER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE,
CAMPAIGN
FINANCE
IN
OHIO
4
(2007),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_48229.pdf
[hereinafter CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN OHIO].
41

See Shea, supra note 9, at 2.

42

See id.

43

See id.

44

See WIS. STAT. § 11.38 (2010); Shea, supra note 9, at 2.

45

Shea, supra note 9, at 2.

46

WIS. LEGIS. FISCAL BUREAU, DEMOCRACY TRUST FUND (GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
BOARD, GENERAL FUND TAXES, MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS, AND STATE TREASURER) 4
(2011),
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public grants available to candidates had to be pro-rated.47 The Wisconsin legislature
also declined to increase spending limits to keep pace with inflation.48
For public funding to work, spending limits must be high enough for candidates to
realistically compete for the office they seek. Otherwise, candidates will not
participate in the public funding system. By 2004, the average amount spent by state
senate candidates in Wisconsin was $93,000.49 This amount was more than two and a
half times the spending limit, and few candidates participated in public funding. 50 In
contrast, Minnesota enacted a campaign finance system mirroring Wisconsin’s, but
Minnesota’s system increased the income tax checkoff to $5, gave taxpayers a partisan
option, and authorized the use of general fund revenue to supplement checkoff
proceeds.51 Minnesota’s ongoing efforts to make its public funding system work
succeeded in many respects, and to this day the system enjoys a high rate of candidate
participation.52
But why did the Democrats, who had enacted the reforms and had been in the
majority ever since, let the system atrophy? To some extent, it was a case of state
legislators putting what they believed was in their personal interest ahead of any
loyalty they may have had to campaign finance reform. 53 One legislator, for example,
who was contemplating running for governor, thought that keeping spending limits
low would benefit him.54 Other legislators declined to support public funding because
it attracted opponents who otherwise would not have run for public office.55 And
others wanted to present themselves as fiscal conservatives unwilling to spend tax
dollars on political campaigns.56
Many Democratic legislators, however, just became too comfortable raising
money from special interest groups, particularly business interests.57 They failed to
recognize that competing with Republicans for business campaign contributions was
a game they were ultimately going to lose. Similarly, they failed to perceive that by
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lfb/budget/2011_13_biennial_budget/102_budget_paper
s/331_government_accountaiblity_board_democracy_trust_fund.pdf.
47

Id.

48

Id.

49

WIS. STAT. § 11.31 (2004); Kenneth R. Mayer, Wisconsin Campaign Finance Project
(2007), https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/10439 (showing
that the spending limit in 2004 was $34,500 for both the primary and general election).
50

Mayer, supra note 49.

51

CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN MINNESOTA, supra note 40, at 14.

52

Id. at 17.

53 Doug Mell, Around the Limit? Governor’s Spending May Test Election Law, WIS. ST. J.,
May 20, 1990, 1990 WLMR 3085100.
54

Id.

55

HERBERT ALEXANDER, REFORM
CAMPAIGNS 46 (1991).

AND

REALITY: THE FINANCING

OF

STATE

AND

LOCAL

56 Pocan and Risser Tout Public Funding Plan, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, 2001 WLNR
8783934.
57

Shea, supra note 9, at 3.
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making special interest money less important, campaign finance reform was in their
party’s long-term interest.
Traditionally, the Democratic Party’s main strength has been its connection to
large numbers of people, primarily low- and middle-income wage earners. In the late
1980s, however, Wisconsin Democrats did little to draw on this strength. 58 Instead,
they relied heavily on money provided by business interests59 and failed to nurture the
campaign finance reforms of the 1970s. Their success at playing the money game was
short-lived, and a few years later, the Republicans won big majorities in both houses
of the Wisconsin legislature.60
Some of the Democrats’ natural allies, such as the Wisconsin Education
Association (“WEAC”), the state’s wealthiest union, similarly miscalculated. Instead
of mobilizing its members and others with an interest in education, such as parents,
WEAC based its election strategy on independent expenditures.61 WEAC focused on
narrow teacher pocketbook issues, came into campaigns in the last several weeks, and
spent large sums of money on negative television advertisements.62 Further, WEAC
repeatedly used the threat of this kind of spending in its lobbying efforts.63 One effect
of this approach was that Republicans became fearful of WEAC’s last minute
spending and less supportive of statutory spending limits.64 Republicans concluded,
not without justification, that they needed more money to defend themselves.65 Thus,
WEAC’s strategy accelerated an independent spending war.66 Business interests
quickly adopted WEAC’s approach, and in a very short time, far exceeded WEAC in
campaign spending.67
Thus, the second important lesson from Wisconsin’s experience with campaign
finance reform is that a system of campaign finance regulation will only thrive if it is
continually nurtured. Such systems are inherently fragile and subject to pressures from
a variety of sources, including elected officials who find campaign finance reform
inconvenient and interest groups that seek political influence. Supporters of campaign
finance reform must work unceasingly to strengthen the regulatory systems they
create. Constant vigilance is necessary, and Wisconsin Democrats did not provide it.
III. AND WISCONSIN ALSO FAILED TO REGULATE SHAM ISSUE ADS
The second major reason for the demise of campaign finance reform in Wisconsin
was the proliferation of sham issue ads. These are the now ubiquitous television
58

See id.

59

See id.

60

WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE
(2013).
61

Shea, supra note 9, at 3.

62

See id.

63

See id.

64

See id.

65

See id.

OF

WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 2013–2014 258

66

Doug Mell, Thompson Lifts Election Spending Lid, WIS. ST. J., Aug. 24, 1990, 1990
WLNR 3077984.
67

Shea, supra note 9, at 3.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss1/5

8

2017]

HOW BIG MONEY RUINED PUBLIC LIFE

9

advertisements that generally say something negative about a candidate, but, instead
of telling viewers how to vote, advise viewers to call the candidate and express their
opinion. Prior to the advent of sham issue ads, candidates running for public office in
Wisconsin controlled their own campaigns. 68 Les Aspin, former Wisconsin
Congressman and United States Secretary of Defense, once said that Wisconsin was a
wonderful state for someone who wanted to run for office; the state was politically
competitive, political parties were relatively weak, and there were no power-brokers
whose blessing a candidate had to receive.69 As Aspin put it, if someone wanted to run
for office in Wisconsin, the candidate only had to recruit some volunteers, find
somebody to help raise money, and start ringing doorbells.70
This political climate began to change in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Special
interest groups with substantial resources began to make independent expenditures
and, because of the large sums of money that these groups had, candidates had to be
prepared to deal with them.71 Further, in 1996, another spending pipeline opened. This
one involved a particularly insidious kind of independent expenditure, sham issue
ads.72 The state’s largest business association, Wisconsin Manufacturers and
Commerce (“WMC”), spent substantial amounts of money on such ads, most of which
involved political attacks on Democratic candidates.73 WMC believed that because
these ads did not direct viewers how to vote, they were not “express advocacy”74 under
Buckley and thus were not subject to campaign finance regulations.75 The possibility
of being able to engage in unregulated political spending was attractive to WMC.76 If
spending were unregulated, WMC could pay for its ads with corporate money which,
under Wisconsin law, was money WMC could not otherwise spend for political
purposes.77 Further, WMC would not have to identify its contributors.78
I was in the Wisconsin State Senate when WMC began spending money on sham
issue ads and had the unpleasant experience of being one of the ads’ first targets. I was
initially elected in 1976 when Les Aspin’s description of running for office in
Wisconsin remained accurate. I recruited a few volunteers, started running, got a few
good breaks (shortly before the election, my opponent was convicted of a felony), and
was ultimately elected. I was fortunate enough to be re-elected to five four-year terms.

68 WIS. DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN, From Sunlight to Darkness: The Demise of Campaign
Finance Disclosure in Wisconsin (Apr. 7, 2004), http://www.wisdc.org/suntodark.php.
69

See id.

70

See id.

71

See id.

72

See id.

73

HYNEK, supra note 4, at 7.

74 Express advocacy refers to political advertisements that clearly support or oppose a
particular electoral outcome. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43–44 (1976).
75

See Elections Bd. v. Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, 597 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Wis. 1999).

76

HYNEK, supra note 4, at 7.

77

See id.

78

See WIS. DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN, supra note 68.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017

9

10

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

In all of my campaigns, I participated in public funding, and in the first three, my
opponent did as well. Not until 1992 did candidate spending even approach $100,000
apiece. Further, in my first five campaigns, no independent group participated.79 In
1996, however, WMC budgeted $250,000 to broadcast a sham issue ad on Milwaukee
television in the last two weeks of the campaign. The ad stated:
State Senator Lynn Adelman is standing in the way of reform. Voting
against curbs on frivolous lawsuits that cost Milwaukee jobs. What’s
worse, Adelman’s made a career of putting the rights of criminals ahead of
the rights of victims: Voting to deny employers the right to keep convicted
felons out of the workplace. That’s wrong. That’s liberal. But that’s Lynn
Adelman. Call Lynn Adelman. Tell him honest working people have rights
too.80
As indicated, sham issue ads were new in Wisconsin, and I was unsure of how to
handle the situation. Independent campaigns subject to campaign finance rules, such
as full public disclosure, contribution limits, and prohibitions on corporate
contributions, were lawful, but WMC was not engaging in that kind of independent
campaign.81 WMC argued that its sham issue ad was not a campaign ad at all because
it did not contain express advocacy.82
I thought the ad was a campaign ad because its purpose was to elect my opponent.
To me, no other reasonable interpretation of the ad was possible because the ad
identified me by name, criticized me, ran just before the election, and appeared only
on stations watched by voters in my district.83 The notion that the purpose of the ad
was to educate voters about issues seemed preposterous. Thus, as I saw it, WMC
violated the law by using corporate money to pay for the ad (which I did not know for
sure but thought highly likely) and by not disclosing the identity of its contributors. I
also worried that if I could not get the ad off the air, I might lose the election because
I was a Democrat representing a heavily Republican district and had won by only 1%
of the vote in the last election four years earlier.84
I concluded that I had no alternative but to file a lawsuit against WMC and the
television stations broadcasting the ad. I brought an action in Milwaukee County
Circuit Court seeking to enjoin further broadcast of the ad (which had started to run)
on the ground that it violated Wisconsin’s campaign finance law. I simultaneously
filed a complaint with the Elections Board. Judge Patricia McMahon rejected WMC’s
argument that the ad was not express advocacy and enjoined further broadcast of it.85
After I filed suit, other Democratic candidates who were the targets of similar
WMC ads elsewhere in the state filed complaints. Courts subsequently enjoined all of

79

See id.

80

Elections Bd., 597 N.W.2d at 724 n.3, 724–25.

81

Id. at 724.

82

Id. at 726.

83

Id.

84
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WMC’s ads from further broadcast.86 An intermediate appellate court affirmed the
injunctions.87 And in 1999, the matter went to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.88 By that
time, however, I no longer controlled the case because the Elections Board had
brought its own suit, and its suit became the case that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
considered.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ducked the question of whether WMC’s sham issue
ads constituted express advocacy under Buckley, but encouraged the Elections Board
to adopt new rules that better defined the forms of advocacy that were subject to
campaign finance regulation. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley wrote a dissenting opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson. The Justices dissented from the court’s
refusal to address the express advocacy question and set forth a test for determining
whether an ad constituted express advocacy.89 In their view, the court needed to
consider the ad’s essential nature:
Is it one that merely discusses issues, and in the process discusses
candidates inextricably linked to those issues, or is it one that advocates
some action for or against a candidate but does so under the guise of
discussing issues? . . . Under such a standard, there can be no doubt that . .
. . [t]he essential nature of these advertisements is candidate advocacy, not
issue advocacy. These advertisements mention issues only as a vehicle of
propping up or tearing down a particular candidate. Take away references
to the candidates and precious little, if anything, would remain of the
advertisement.90
After the Wisconsin Supreme Court failed to resolve the sham issue ad problem,
the Wisconsin legislature and the Elections Board similarly failed. The collective
result of these failures was that spending on such ads increased astronomically, and
sham issue ads became the most important form of political advertising in
Wisconsin.91 In 1998, an explosion of sham issue ad spending contributed to producing
Wisconsin’s first million dollar state senate race.92 In 2000, special interest groups
spent $2.3 million, and candidates spent an additional $700,000 in a senate race in
rural Wisconsin.93 In 2002, the amount of money spent on sham issue ads far exceeded
independent expenditures by committees subject to public disclosure requirements and
contribution limits.94 In 2006, special interest groups spent approximately $15 million
86

Id.

87

Id. at 725.

88

See id.

89

Id. at 742.

90

Id.

91

NOVAK & SHAH, supra note 1, at 8.

92 Mike McCabe, Campaign Finance Reform in Wisconsin: Where We’ve Been, Where
Things Stand Today and Where We Go from Here, WISCONSIN DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN (Oct.
17,
2001),
https://web.archive.org/web/20051119131723/www.wisdc.org/campfinreform_progrpt.php.
93

Id.

94

NOVAK & SHAH, supra note 1, at 8.
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on sham issue ads, more than triple the amount spent in 2002.95 Since then, spending
on sham issue ads has only continued to increase.96
Currently, special interest groups and wealthy contributors (including individuals
and corporations) favor sham issue ads because they are unregulated, and the public
can be kept in the dark about who is paying for them.97 Thus, dark money dominates
almost every high spending election in Wisconsin.98 Candidate committees, which are
subject to contribution limits and public disclosure requirements, are rarely able to
match the amount of money raised for unregulated expenditures. Therefore, the third
important lesson from Wisconsin’s experience with campaign finance reform is that
to be effective, campaign finance legislation must regulate sham issue ads.
IV. THE CORRUPTING EFFECT OF WISCONSIN’S REGULATORY FAILURE
By the early 2000s, the campaign finance reform legislation that Wisconsin
pioneered in the 1970s had, for the most part, been rendered irrelevant, and the halcyon
days of Wisconsin politics that Les Aspin described were long gone. 99 The breakdown
of the reform legislation resulted in an explosion of special interest spending and an
enormous increase in the importance of political money.100 And the result of
Wisconsin’s regulatory failure has been grave damage to the public life of the state.
For example, voters in Wisconsin now have fewer electoral choices than they once
had because fewer people run for public office.101 In 1970, not a single legislative race
was uncontested, whereas by 2002, 50% of the candidates for legislative office ran
unopposed.102
Furthermore, the increased importance of money in state elections has adversely
affected the functioning of the Wisconsin legislature. Wisconsin was once known for
its independent legislators.103 It was a place where mavericks thrived. Former U.S.
Senator Bill Proxmire, for example, who was re-elected to the Senate in 1982 after
spending less than $150 on his campaign, got his start in the Wisconsin Assembly.104
However, as money became more important in the electoral process, legislative power

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Mary Bottari, Undisclosed Dark Money Reigns Supreme in Wisconsin, PRWATCH (Oct.
5,
2016),
http://www.prwatch.org/news/2016/10/13154/dark-money-reigns-supreme-inwisconsin.
99 Wisconsin’s public funding system limped along until 2010 when Republican Scott
Walker was elected governor. In his first budget bill, Walker eliminated the public funding
mechanism for all state political and judicial campaigns. See 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 139.
100 MIKE MCCABE, BLUE JEANS
POLITICS 46 (2014).
101

Id. at 45.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id. at 43.
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became increasingly centralized.105 Legislative leaders now control most legislative
fundraising as well as the allocation of funds to candidates.106 And few, if any,
mavericks remain.
The demise of campaign finance reform also led to the diminution of Wisconsin’s
status as a model good government state. Increased campaign spending was one of
several factors that contributed to the Republican Party’s takeover of the state
legislature.107 Regrettably, the GOP’s stewardship of Wisconsin’s good government
tradition has been less than exemplary. In 2015, the non-partisan Center for Public
Integrity gave Wisconsin an overall grade of “D” on its national report card on
government transparency and accountability.108 Further, it gave Wisconsin grades of
“F” in public access to information, political financing, and legislative
accountability.109
Some examples of the legislature’s recent work demonstrate why Wisconsin
received these grades. In 2010, the legislature enacted one of the worst partisan
gerrymanders in modern American history.110 More recently, working with the
Governor, legislative leaders attempted to undo Wisconsin’s long-standing
commitment to transparency in government by inserting a last minute amendment into
the state budget that gutted the state’s open records law. 111 The legislature withdrew
the amendment only because of a public outcry led by the media.112
The legislature also eliminated Wisconsin’s watchdog agency, the Government
Accountability Board (“GAB”), a non-partisan body consisting of six retired judges
that was created to take over the duties of the Elections and Ethics Boards.113 A wellknown election law expert referred to the GAB as “a model for the nation.” 114
105

Id.

106

Id. at 45.

107 Jason Stein & Annysa Johnson, Republicans Take over State Senate, Assembly,
J.
SENTINEL
(Nov.
2,
2010),
MILWAUKEE
http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/106582898.html/.
108 Patricia Simms, Wisconsin Gets D Grade in 2015 State Integrity Investigation, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/11/09/18562/wisconsingets-d-grade-2015-state-integrity-investigation.
109 Ernst-Ulrich Franzen, Another Bad Grade for the State, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov.
23, 2015, at A9.
110

Complaint at 1–2, Whitford v. Nichol, No. 3:15-CV-00421 (W.D. Wis. July 8, 2015).

111 Brendan Fischer, As Walker Announces, Wisconsin GOP Moves to Gut Open Records
Law, PRWATCH (July 2, 2015), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2015/07/12872/Scott WalkerWI-GOP-Gut-Open-Records.
112 Dennis Punzel, Scott Walker, Legislative Leaders Drop Open Records Changes, WIS.
STATE J. (July 6, 2015), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/scottwa…ecords-changes/article_0b1fb6da-39d2-5229-b54e-491aa98901db.html.
113

Patrick Marley, GOP Bills Would Hike Contribution Limits, Split GAB into Two
J.
SENTINEL
(Oct.
7,
2015),
Agencies,
MILWAUKEE
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/assembly-republicans-want-to-splitgab-into-twoagencies-b99592139z1-331067811.html.
114

Id. (quoting Professor Daniel Tokaji); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, America’s Top Model:
The Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 572 (2013).
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Wisconsin’s largest newspaper opined that the GAB was eliminated to create “a
watchdog with no teeth.”115 In addition, the legislature made investigating political
corruption more difficult for prosecutors, 116 weakened the public disclosure
requirement and other provisions of the state’s campaign finance law, 117 and
diminished long-standing civil service protections for state employees.118
Further, the demise of campaign finance reform legislation, along with the
increased importance of political money, harmed public life in Wisconsin in yet
another way. It led to the emergence of a phenomenon, once rare in the state, the major
political scandal.119 In the last fifteen years, Wisconsin has been beset by three such
scandals, one involving legislative campaigns, one involving a gubernatorial
campaign, and one involving campaigns for the Wisconsin Supreme Court and their
aftermath.120 Wisconsin’s lapse as a good government state and these scandals have
contributed to increased disrespect for the Wisconsin state government. 121 The
scandals also teach another important lesson: even a model state can be corrupted in a
very short time.
A. The Legislature’s Caucus Scandal
The first scandal, widely known as the caucus scandal, grew directly out of the
increased centralization of legislative power and the expansive use of such power to
raise money for political campaigns.122 Partisan caucus organizations, staffed by state
employees, were created in the late 1960s to perform public policy research for what
were generally part-time legislators who had minimal staff support.123 Each party in
the state assembly and senate had a caucus staff.124 With the ever increasing
importance of money in politics, however, legislative leaders began to use caucus
employees to assist in fundraising and related political activity rather than for
research.125
115

Editorial, Let Watchdog Do Its Job, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 2015, at A9.

116

Ernst-Ulrich Franzen, Closing Government’s Curtains, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 2,
2015, at A11.
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Id.

118 Chris Taylor, Republicans Ransack Civil Service System, URBAN MILWAUKEE (Oct. 30,
2015),
http://urbanmilwaukee.com/2015/10/30/op-ed-republicans-ransack-civil-servicesystem/.
119

MCCABE, supra note 100, at 50.
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Louis Fortis & Lisa Kaiser, Has Wisconsin Become a Corrupt State?, SHEPHERD EXPRESS
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Although the unlawful activity of caucus employees was an open secret, neither
the Elections Board nor the Ethics Board took any action. The full picture did not
emerge until a part-time political reporter and a local district attorney got involved.126
After a lengthy investigation, legislative leaders of both parties and several legislative
staffers were charged with numerous felonies and lesser offenses.127
The criminal complaints indicate the centrality of fundraising to the caucus
scandal. For example, the complaint against Republican Assembly Speaker Scott
Jensen alleged that Jensen met with the “four horsemen” (the lobbyists from WMC,
the Farm Bureau, the Builders, and the Realtors)128 and directed them where to send
their clients’ money and whether they should give it “directly to campaigns or as
independent expenditures.”129 And, the complaint against Democratic Senate Majority
Leader Chuck Chvala alleged that he “designed a scheme” to conceal his control of a
PAC so that his aide, who was presumably running the PAC, would not know of his
control “and could not be a witness against him.”130
The caucus probe ended in the criminal convictions of six legislators and several
legislative staffers.131 The scandal destroyed the political careers of the convicted
legislators, and the legislature enacted legislation abolishing the caucuses.132 The
caucus scandal was a watershed in Wisconsin political history. The intense emphasis
on money had changed the state’s political culture, and it was difficult to imagine how
the genie that had been released could be stuffed back into the bottle.133
B. The Governor’s Campaign Coordination Scandal
A few years after the resolution of the final case in the caucus scandal, another
campaign finance scandal emerged. This scandal involved the activities of Governor
Scott Walker’s campaign in the 2012 gubernatorial recall election and several
supposedly independent entities, including WMC and the Wisconsin Club for Growth
(“WiCFG”).134 This scandal concerned sums of money many orders of magnitude
larger than the amounts involved in the caucus scandal.135 The scandal began to unfold
when a bipartisan group of district attorneys and the GAB began an investigation into
the potentially unlawful campaign coordination between Walker’s campaign
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Shea, supra note 9, at 3.
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WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, supra note 123, at 2–8.

128 George Hesselberg, Charges in Caucus Scandal Long Overdue, WIS. ST. J., Oct. 22,
2002, 2002 WLNR 10451343, at D1.
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NBC15.COM
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committee and supposed independents.136 Coordinated campaign expenditures are
generally regarded as in-kind campaign contributions, subject to the same public
disclosure requirements and contribution limits applicable to a candidate’s campaign
contributions.137
The reason for anti-coordination rules is that if a candidate can coordinate with an
independent group that, under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
United v. FEC,138 can accept secret, unlimited contributions, then contribution and
disclosure rules that apply to political candidates are meaningless.139 A large
contribution to a supposedly independent group that coordinated with a candidate
would have the same effect as a direct contribution to the candidate.140 Furthermore,
because the contribution remained secret, the public would never know whether the
contributors later received special treatment from the political candidates they

136 Brendan Fischer, Evidence Mounting that Walker Campaign is at Center of Criminal
Probe, PRWATCH (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2014/02/12377/walkercampaign-finance-probe-court-docs-show.
137

In 1999, the state court of appeals held in Wis. Coal. for Voter Participation Inc. v. State
Elections Bd., that, as is the case under federal law, Wisconsin law can count issue ad
“expenditures that are ‘coordinated’ with, or made ‘in cooperation with or with the consent of
a candidate . . . or an authorized committee’ as campaign contributions.” 605 N.W.2d 654, 660
(Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46–47 (1976)). As a result of that
decision, the Elections Board pursued an investigation into illegal coordination between a
campaign led by Mark Block and an “independent” group that sent issue ad postcards. Brendan
Fischer, Top Six Facts in the Walker Dark Money Criminal Probe, PRWATCH (May 13, 2014),
http://www.prwatch.org/news/2014/05/12475/scottwalker-john-doe-darkmoney-sixthings.
That probe resulted in a settlement pursuant to which Block was fined and barred from politics
for three years. Id. In addition, in 2002 the Elections Board issued an opinion citing both state
and federal cases to advise that coordinated electoral issue ads are contributions under
Wisconsin law. Id. In 2008, the GAB re-affirmed that opinion. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY BD., El.
Bd.
00-2
(2008),
http://www.gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/29/00_02opelbd_pdf_17587.pdf.
138

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2009).

139 Brendan Fischer, Scott Walker John Doe Ruling and the Well-Funded Assault on WI
(July
1,
2015),
Campaign
Finance
Law,
PRWATCH
http://www.prwatch.org/news/2015/07/12884/scott-walker-john-doe-assault-campaignfinance-law.
140 Id.; see also FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 464 (2001)
(“Colorado II”) (“There is no significant functional difference between a party’s coordinated
expenditure and a direct party contribution to the candidate, . . . .”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78
(construing federal law to treat “all expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the consent
of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate,” i.e., coordinated
expenditures, as contributions); In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 416–17 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that
“for purposes of First Amendment scrutiny, ‘prearranged or coordinated expenditures’ are
constitutionally equivalent to contributions” and that “it followed that coordinated expenditures
are subject to the same limitations and scrutiny that apply to contributions.”) (quoting Buckley,
424 U.S. at 46, 47).
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supported.141 Thus, anti-coordination rules are one of the few remaining bulwarks
against a completely lawless campaign finance landscape.142
As a result of the unveiling of information regarding possible unlawful
coordination between Walker’s campaign committee and supposed independent
groups, an experienced federal prosecutor with a Republican background was
appointed to investigate the matter.143 The special prosecutor concluded that Walker’s
campaign and groups such as WiCFG had, in fact, coordinated their political activities
and violated Wisconsin’s campaign finance laws. 144 Specifically, the special
prosecutor determined that Walker secretly raised millions of dollars for WiCFG and
evaded campaign finance disclosure requirements.145 He concluded that Walker’s staff
had advised Walker to “stress that donations to WiCFG are not disclosed” and that
“corporate contributions” could be accepted and are “not reported” when soliciting
campaign funds.146 In addition, the prosecutor discovered evidence that caused him to
suspect that the Walker campaign coordinated with groups engaged in express
advocacy.147
One effect of the alleged Walker/WiCFG coordination scheme was that voters
were left in the dark about who was influencing elections in Wisconsin and whether
they might be getting something in return. For example, no campaign finance reports
disclosed to Wisconsin citizens that a Florida-based mining company, which lobbied
for a massive open pit mine in Wisconsin, contributed $700,000 to WiCFG to spend
in support of Walker’s agenda.148 Nor did any reports reveal that John Menard, owner
of a chain of hardware stores, gave $1.5 million to WiCFG for similar purposes.149

141 Fischer, supra note 139; see also O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“Buckley held that the Constitution allows limits on how much one person can contribute to a
politician’s campaign. If campaigns tell potential contributors to divert money to nominally
independent groups that have agreed to do the campaigns’ bidding, these contribution limits
become porous, and the requirement that politicians’ campaign committees disclose the donors
and amounts becomes useless.”).
142

Fischer, supra note 139.
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Voters, therefore, were unable to assess whether Menard’s donation had anything to
do with his receipt of at least $1.8 million in tax credits from Walker’s job
development agency.150
The evidence appeared to lead the special prosecutor to conclude that through
unlawful coordination, WiCFG and other big money groups bankrolled Walker’s 2012
recall victory.151 WiCFG alone spent at least $9.1 million on Wisconsin’s 2011 and
2012 recall elections and funneled almost $9.6 million more to other groups, including
WMC, that supported the re-election efforts.152
WiCFG and other groups whose activity the special prosecutor was investigating
launched an aggressive legal and public relations campaign to discredit the
investigation.153 Their legal contention was that Wisconsin could not apply its anticoordination rules to them because the money they spent in coordination with
Walker’s campaign was spent on issue ads that the State could not regulate consistent
with the First Amendment.154 They brought this argument to the federal courts and
lost.155
Federal appellate court judge Frank Easterbrook, a Ronald Reagan presidential
appointee, indicated that no federal or state court had ever held that the First
Amendment barred regulation of coordination between campaign committees and
issue advocacy groups.156 Nor had any federal or state court held that the First
Amendment forbid an inquiry into that topic. 157 Ultimately, the targets of the
investigation shifted to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. This brings us to Wisconsin’s
third major money in politics scandal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court scandal.
C. The Wisconsin Supreme Court Scandal
The Wisconsin Supreme Court scandal does not refer to a single event, but rather
involved the elections of a number of the court’s justices and the conduct of those
justices. The story begins in 2007 when an open seat on the court led to a campaign
unprecedented in the amount of money spent, particularly the amount of dark
money.158 The interest groups and the candidates spent nearly $6 million on the
campaign.159 This amount was over four times more than had ever been spent on a
https://www.yahoo.com/politics/wisconsin-gov-scott-walker-photo-charlie114429739886.html.
150
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state supreme court campaign, and the special interest groups far outspent the
candidates.160 For example, WMC spent an estimated $2.2 million, and WiCFG spent
an estimated $400,000.161 Most of the special interest money was spent on sham issue
ads.162
Elected to the court was trial court judge Annette Ziegler.163 After the election, the
Judicial Commission, which is responsible for monitoring judicial conduct, charged
Ziegler with misconduct for ruling on cases in which her husband had a financial
interest.164 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reprimanded Ziegler and fined her $10,000,
making her the first justice in history to be so punished.165
The 2008 Wisconsin Supreme Court election was worse.166 Several years prior,
Governor Jim Doyle appointed Wisconsin’s first African-American supreme court
justice, Louis Butler.167 After Butler’s appointment, the court would occasionally split
4–3 in favor of plaintiffs on civil liability issues, as it did in a case involving medical
malpractice168 and another involving the liability of manufacturers of lead paint.169 As
a result, WMC and other business groups made defeating Butler a priority.170
Naturally, WMC was unconcerned about the problems created by high-spending
judicial campaigns funded primarily by dark money.171 Rather, its focus was on
ensuring that a majority of the court’s members shared its position on civil liability
issues and others that it regarded as important.172 Thus, an obscure trial court judge
and former prosecutor, Michael Gableman, was recruited to run against Butler.173 In
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the Butler/Gableman election, WMC spent an estimated $1.7 million on sham issue
ads, and WiCFG spent an estimated $507,000.174
The special interest group ads mostly accused Butler of being soft on crime.175
This, of course, was not WMC’s real concern,176 but crime made for more compelling
television ads than civil liability issues. Gableman’s ads likewise charged Butler with
being soft on crime.177
One of Gabelman’s ads was so misleading that the Judicial Commission charged
him with misconduct based on the ad’s “reckless disregard for the truth.”178
Specifically, the ad attacked work that Butler did during his pre-judicial career as a
criminal defense attorney.179 It told viewers that Louis Butler worked “to put criminals
back on the street”180 and misleadingly implied that Butler had been responsible as a
judge for the release of a repeat child molester.181 Notwithstanding the dishonesty of
Gableman’s commercial, the attack ads run by his campaign, WMC, and WiCFG
succeeded, and Butler became the first incumbent justice since 1967 to lose at the
polls.182 As for the misconduct charge against Gableman, the court deadlocked 3–3.
Justices David Prosser, Patience Roggensack, and Annette Ziegler supported
Gableman and enabled him to avoid sanction for misconduct.183 And the service of
Wisconsin’s first African-American supreme court justice was short-lived.
It was later discovered that Gableman received two years of free legal counsel on
his defense of the Judicial Commission’s misconduct charge from a law firm that
regularly appeared before the Wisconsin Supreme Court.184 In ten cases in which the
firm appeared during that period, Gableman recused himself just once.185 In addition,
Gableman did not disclose his receipt of free legal services.186 Rather, a lawyer
appearing in a case before the Supreme Court discovered the potential conflict.187 The
arrangement between Gableman and the law firm arguably created the appearance of
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a quid pro quo, and it is well-established that a judge must disqualify himself if his
impartiality can reasonably be questioned.188
In 2009, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court jettisoned the recusal rule. 189 In
a 4–3 vote, Justices Prosser, Roggensack, Ziegler, and Gableman weakened the basis
for recusal by adopting word for word a proposal submitted by WMC and the
Wisconsin Realtors Association.190 The adopted proposal provided that campaign
contributions to a justice or independent expenditures on a justice’s behalf do not
require recusal.191 The dissenting opinion emphasized that the court’s integrity was at
stake and that “judges must be perceived as beyond price.”192 Justice Roggensack
defended the court’s action, arguing that because the judiciary is elected, requiring a
justice to recuse herself because of a conflict of interest would diminish the
significance of her supporters’ votes.193 Soon after, in another 4–3 vote, the same four
justices ruled that a justice’s decision not to recuse was final and could not be reviewed
by the rest of the court.194
In 2011, Justice Prosser ran for re-election and was opposed by an assistant
attorney general.195 Again, the campaign involved enormous spending by outside
groups, including $1.1 million on sham issue ads by WMC and $520,000 by
WiCFG.196 Prosser was re-elected, but he was soon back in the headlines.197 In March
2012, the Judicial Commission filed ethics violations charges against him based on an
incident that occurred in June 2011.198 He allegedly placed his hands on the neck of
another justice, Ann Walsh Bradley, and subjected her to a chokehold.199 The
188
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Commission appointed a special prosecutor to pursue the charges.200 The charges also
included an allegation that Prosser had “‘demonstrated a tendency toward lack of
proper decorum and civility’ because he had called Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson
a ‘total bitch’ . . . .”201 The Commission asked the Wisconsin Supreme Court to send
the case to a panel of appeals court judges to determine whether Prosser had violated
three ethics rules.202 The court, however, did nothing. Like Gableman, Prosser avoided
sanctions.203
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to take action on the Judicial
Commission’s complaints against Gableman and Prosser, it did take action against the
chairman of the Commission. In May 2012, the four justice majority voted to block
the reappointment of retired Milwaukee lawyer, John Dawson, as chairman. 204 This
decision represented a departure from the court’s long-standing practice of retaining
appointees who were eligible for reappointment and whose service was satisfactory.205
The committee in charge of nominating members of the Judicial Commission had
previously urged the court to reappoint Dawson and praised his “leadership skills.” 206
Finally, in 2013, Justice Roggensack was re-elected with the assistance of
$850,000 in expenditures on sham issue ads by WMC and $350,000 by WiCFG.207
Even though Roggensack’s victory ensured that the ideological make-up of the court
would remain unchanged, Roggensack and her allies were not satisfied. 208 They
hatched a scheme to remove eighty-one-year-old Shirley Abrahamson as the court’s
chief justice.209 On the surface, the scheme made little sense because the position of
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chief justice confers only modest administrative powers.210 However, proponents of
the change could not abide the liberal Abrahamson and sought to amend the state
constitution to enable the justices to elect the chief justice.211 For 126 years, the longest
serving member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court automatically became the chief
justice, but Roggensack and her allies were certain that with their 4–3 majority, they
could remove Abrahamson through an election.212
Accordingly, Roggensack lobbied legislators and urged them to support the
amendment.213 Her behavior inspired one observer to refer to her as the “Lady
MacBeth” of the court because the likelihood that she would replace Abrahamson as
chief justice in an election among the justices made her lobbying look Shakespearean:
the younger justice trying to kill the queen.214 In contrast, Abrahamson desisted from
lobbying and tried to avoid politicizing the court.215 Once the amendment passed the
legislature and needed voter approval, WMC sprang into action. WMC launched a
$600,000 advertising blitz in support of the amendment.216 WMC’s money was critical
because no grassroots support for the amendment existed.217 Registrants for the
amendment included WMC and former justice Jon Wilcox, whose own campaign was
fined $10,000 for the same type of illegal campaign coordination that was at issue in
the investigation pending before the Wisconsin Supreme Court.218 In fact, Wilcox’s
case established the Wisconsin precedent that coordination with outside groups was
illegal.219
Given WMC’s financial support, voters unsurprisingly supported the amendment,
although they did so narrowly.220 When Abrahamson challenged the retroactive aspect
of the amendment in federal court221—proponents of the amendment were unwilling
to wait until the end of her term for it to take effect—the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
ran a story with the droll headline, “Will the Real Chief Justice Please Stand.”222 While
Abrahamson made no statements to the press, Roggensack, who had been elected chief
210

Id.

211

Caplan, Destruction of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, supra note 193.

212

Mary Bottari, WMC Spends $600,000 to Demote Chief Justice as Criminal Probe of
(Mar.
31,
2015),
Walker
Campaign
Looms,
PRWATCH
http://www.prwatch.org/news/2015/03/12784/wisconsin-manufacturers-and-commercespends-600000-demote-chief-justice [hereinafter Bottari, WMC Spends $600,000].
213 Bruce Murphy, Lady MacBeth of the Supreme Court, URB. MILWAUKEE, (May 7, 2015),
http://urbanmilwaukee.com/2015/05/07/murphys-law-lady-macbeth-of-the-supreme-court/
[hereinafter Murphy, Lady MacBeth].
214

Id.

215

Id.

216

Bottari, WMC Spends $600,000, supra note 212.

217

Id.

218

Id.

219

Id.

220

Bauer, supra note 209.

221

Caplan, Destruction of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, supra note 193.

222

Murphy, Lady MacBeth, supra note 213.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017

23

24

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

justice, called into a talk radio show and criticized both Abrahamson and the
newspaper.223
As chief justice, two of Roggensack’s first actions were to close the procedure for
appointing members to the Judicial Commission to the public and to fill a vacancy on
the Commission with Joe Olson, a Republican operative who was sanctioned and
excoriated by a three-judge federal court in a suit challenging the legislature’s
gerrymandering of electoral districts to favor Republicans.224
Thus, like the caucus scandal and the campaign coordination scandal, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court scandal has harmed the reputation of one of the three
branches of Wisconsin’s government. Lincoln Caplan, a writer who has closely
followed the court, observed that a decade-long saga of money-fueled elections has
transformed it from “one of the nation’s most respected state tribunals into a
disgraceful mess.”225 He pointed out that the absence of effective campaign finance
regulation has turned Wisconsin judicial campaigns into a grubby embarrassment to
good government.226 He also noted that the integrity of the justices that made up the
majority on the court was “compromised, as plainly as if they had personally solicited
every dollar that helped elect them.”227
D. The Campaign Coordination and the Wisconsin Supreme Court Scandals
Intersect
As previously mentioned, WiCFG, WMC, and other targets of the campaign
coordination investigation involving the Governor’s recall election wanted to shut the
investigation down.228 After failing to succeed in this effort in federal court, they
brought the matter to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.229 Thus, two of Wisconsin’s
campaign finance scandals, the campaign coordination scandal and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court scandal, intersected in a kind of perfect storm.
Initially, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to hear any oral arguments in the
case, either in public or in a closed courtroom. 230 Justice Abrahamson dissented from
this decision, stating that she found it both “highly unusual” and “alarming.” 231
Thus, the campaign coordination case went behind closed doors for consideration
by four justices elected with the assistance of massive ad buys by WiCFG and
223
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WMC,232 both of which were parties to the case.233 The prosecutors in charge of the
investigation asked Justices Prosser and Gableman to recuse themselves, arguing that
the justices’ ability to fairly rule on a case that involved parties largely responsible for
their own elections could reasonably be questioned.234 In addition, a number of
distinguished legal ethicists as well as prominent public interest organizations, such
as the James Madison Center for Free Speech, The Ethics and Public Policy Center,
and The Brennan Center for Justice, argued that the United States Constitution
required the justices to recuse themselves.235
The argument in support of recusal was roughly as follows: WiCFG, WMC, and
their offshoots spent millions of dollars in support of Prosser’s election, approximately
five times as much as the Prosser campaign itself spent in an election that was decided
by about seven thousand votes.236 In support of Gableman’s election, WMC spent
some five and a half times the amount that Gableman’s own campaign spent, and
WiCFG also surpassed the Gableman campaign’s spending.237 Gableman prevailed in
his election by about twenty thousand votes.238 The closeness of these elections
indicated that in the absence of WMC’s and WiCFG’s heavy political spending,
Justices Prosser and Gableman would not have prevailed. In addition, the justices had
a personal stake in the outcome of the case since a decision closing the investigation
into campaign coordination would make it easier for WiCFG and WMC to support the
justices in future campaigns. Nevertheless, relying on the recusal rule that the court
had previously adopted, the justices declined to recuse themselves. 239
Then, on July 16, 2015, in a 4–2 decision—Justice Ann Walsh Bradley recused
herself because her son was a member of a law firm participating in the case240—the
court closed the investigation into unlawful campaign coordination and declared that
any coordination that occurred did not violate the law since it only involved issue
ads.241 The court did not address the fact that the prosecutor was also looking into the
232
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matter of Walker’s campaign coordination with groups engaged in express
advocacy.242 Again in dissent, Justice Abrahamson called the majority’s decision “an
unprecedented and faulty interpretation of Wisconsin’s campaign finance law and of
the First Amendment.”243 Also dissenting, Justice Patrick Crooks stated that the
majority’s analysis of the campaign finance issue was flawed and “will profoundly
affect the integrity of our electoral process.”244
As a result of the court’s ruling, candidates, including the justices who decided the
case, can permissibly work hand-in-glove with “independent” groups that take
unlimited, secret donations as long as they only coordinate regarding issue ads.245 The
effect of the court’s decision is to render Wisconsin’s post-Watergate contribution
limits and public disclosure requirements applicable to candidates meaningless.
Quoting Judge Easterbrook, Justice Abrahamson wrote, “[i]f campaigns tell potential
contributors to divert money to nominally independent groups that have agreed to do
the campaigns’ bidding, these contribution limits become porous, and the requirement
that politicians’ campaign committees disclose the donors and amounts become
useless.”246
The Campaign Legal Center, a non-partisan body which seeks to strengthen the
public’s voice in the political arena, characterized the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s
opinion as an “absurdity” and declared that the court had abdicated its “responsibility
to engage in reasoned judicial review of the laws at issue.”247 It further stated:
A fundamental precept of judicial decision-making is that a court should
analyze the past precedents that most closely resemble the case at bar to
render a decision . . . . [T]he [United States Supreme] Court has been
unwavering in distinguishing between expenditure restrictions and
contribution restrictions . . . . It has also been steadfast in supporting the
theory that “all expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the consent
of the candidate,” i.e., coordinated expenditures, should be treated as
“disguised contributions” subject to limitation and disclosure . . . . It is thus
inexplicable that the Wisconsin court decided a constitutional case about
coordinated spending without analyzing—or even referencing—a single
[United States] Supreme Court case about coordinated spending.248
Another commentator wrote that the court’s decision “is erroneous under federal
precedent and fundamentally misunderstands the Supreme Court’s holdings
242
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distinguishing between independent spending and spending coordinated with a
candidate.”249 The writer further noted that “the [Wisconsin Supreme] Court’s
reasoning lacked a coherent basis or a foundation in federal case law,” and that the
immediate effect of the decision would be to render Wisconsin’s regulatory scheme
“inoperable” and to make contribution limits “meaningless.”250 Thus, the court’s
handling of the campaign coordination issue not only destroyed one of the few
important remaining provisions of Wisconsin’s campaign finance law, but signified
the further decline of a once respected judicial body.
One further aspect of the court’s handling of the campaign coordination case
requires mention. For unknown reasons, the court was extremely concerned about the
possibility that the evidence that the prosecutors had uncovered might be disclosed to
someone.251 So fearful was the court that when the prosecutors who wished to seek
review of the decision in the United States Supreme Court asked for permission to
show the evidence to their lawyers so that they could prepare a certiorari petition, the
court refused.252 As a result of this unbelievable decision, the prosecutors had to file
their petition to the United States Supreme Court pro se.253
249 Brent Ferguson, A New Threat to the Viability of Campaign Contribution Limits, 65
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In a column about Bill Clinton winning the 1992 presidential election, [Bradley] called
voters either stupid or evil for electing “a tree-hugging, baby-killing, pot-smoking, flagburning, queer-loving, draft-dodging, bull-spouting, ‘60s radical socialist adulterer to
the highest office in our nation.” “Either you condone drug use, homosexuality, AIDsproducing sex, adultery and murder, and are therefore a bad person, or you don’t know
that he supports abortion on demand and socialism, which means you are dumb. Have
I offended anyone? Good — some of you really need to wake up.”
Jason Stein et al., Bradley Extra Marital Affair, Role in Child Placement Surface, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.jsonline.com/news/state politics/bradley-extramarital-affair-role-in-child-placement-surface-699684605z1-371700831.html. In 2014, Kelly
wrote that affirmative action and slavery were comparable. “Morally, and as a matter of law,
they are the same.” This was so according to Kelly because both involve “an unwanted,
economic relationship.” Bruce Murphy, Walker’s Bizarre Choice for High Court, URB.
MILWAUKEE (July 28, 2016), http://urbanmilwaukee.com/2016/07/28/murphys-law-walkersbizarre-choice-for-high-court/ (quoting Daniel Kelly).
After her appointment, Bradley successfully stood for election. Once again, the biggest spender
in her campaign against appellate court judge Joanne Kloppenburg was not a candidate but
rather a dark money group which called itself the Wisconsin Alliance for Reform (“WAR”) and
was registered by Lorri Pickens, a Koch network operative. Jessica Mason & Mary Bottari,
WAR on Voters: Big Money Streams into WI Supreme Court Race with No Disclosure,
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V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The Wisconsin legislature, as presently constituted, is unlikely to embark on a
constructive reform of state campaign finance law. It recently enacted legislation that
doubled the amount that donors can contribute to candidates, allowed corporations to
give unlimited amounts to political parties and campaign committees, and eliminated
the requirement that contributors identify their employer. 254 Worse, it codified the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision authorizing candidates to coordinate with
advocacy groups that sponsor issue ads. 255 No other state that limits contributions in
elections allows such coordination.256
Thus, those who would like Wisconsin to be a model good government state once
again have no alternative but to think about the long term. Ultimately, the Wisconsin
legislature needs to enact a new campaign finance reform statute that, among other
things, regulates sham issue ads and creates a robust system of partial public funding.
For such a statute to survive a constitutional challenge, however, the United States
Supreme Court will have to change direction on the issue of campaign finance reform
legislation. When Justice Scalia was on the court, five justices took a single-mindedly
libertarian view of the First Amendment.257 The approach of these justices was one
dimensional.258 Their view tilted the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence heavily
in favor of the rich and powerful and further contributed to undermining democracy
in Wisconsin and elsewhere.259
As Wisconsin’s experience indicates, one essential reform is to ensure that sham
issue ads are regulated like other political advertisements. If such a reform were
b. WAR spent some $3 million in highly misleading sham issue ads including an ad accusing
Kloppenburg of being soft on sex offenders. Steven Elbow, Enthusiastic Republican Voters
Push Bradley over Kloppenburg in Wisconsin Supreme Court Race, CAPITAL TIMES (Apr. 6,
2016), http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/writers/steven_elbow/enthusiastic-republicanvoters-push-bradley-over-kloppenburg-in-wisconsin-supreme/article_e6bebc64-fbb5-11e58eb5-571fad822fd7.html.
Kelly has yet to face election. Interestingly, in 2008, Bradley and Kelly co-authored an article
attacking a proposal of the Judicial Integrity Committee of the State Bar designed to discourage
state supreme court candidates from employing false, unfair, or offensive speech in their
campaigns. Don Daugherty et al., Improper Role for State Bar, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Jan.
20, 2008), http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/29578309.html.
It is also worth noting that when Prosser retired, over the objection of numerous legislators,
Chief Justice Roggensack announced that the State Law Library was being renamed after
Prosser. Erica Strebel, State Law Library to Be Named After Prosser, WIS. L.J.COM (July 15,
2016), http://wislawjournal.com/2016/07/15/state-law-library-to-be-named-after-prosser/.
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adopted, many, if not most, sham issue ads would disappear. Yet, in a 5–4 decision in
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,260 the United States Supreme Court announced a
standard that makes such regulation difficult. The Court stated that an issue ad can be
regulated consistent with the First Amendment only if it “is susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate” and that the context of the ad should not play a “significant role” in the
analysis.261 This approach seems perversely unconnected to reality. Few, if any, issue
ads have any purpose other than to influence votes, and few involve any discussion of
issues that is not entirely incidental to the goal of electing a candidate. More accurate
is Justice Souter’s statement in dissent that “the line between ‘issue’ broadcasts and
outright electioneering [is] a patent fiction.”262
The United States Supreme Court has also made creating an effective public
funding system more difficult. The court has constrained legislatures from establishing
any kind of rescue fund for candidates who, because of heavy spending by privately
financed candidates or independent committees, are placed at a substantial financial
disadvantage.263 In Davis v. FEC,264 another 5–4 decision, the Court struck down the
Millionaires Amendment, which increased contribution limits for House candidates
facing self-financed opponents who spent more than $350,000 of their own money.265
The Court held that the law impermissibly burdened wealthy candidates. 266 Also, in
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Pac v. Bennett,267 the Court invalidated a
statute that provided additional funds up to a certain amount to publicly financed
candidates facing big spending by privately financed opponents.268
Overturning the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence obviously will not occur
overnight. But as John Gardner once said, “[r]eform isn’t for the short winded.”269
Someday, a future president will appoint justices who are open to campaign finance
reform.270 Constitutional scholars have developed a rich set of alternative
understandings of the First Amendment which would allow reasonable regulation of
money in politics consistent with the Constitution, American history, and democratic
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values.271 Waiting in the wings are well-thought-out approaches that would provide
political spending with significant First Amendment protection and would, at the same
time, accommodate competing constitutional values such as electoral integrity and
political equality.272
Signs indicate that as the result of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United273 and the large sums of money that special interest groups are
spending to elect their favored candidates, the public has become increasingly aware
of the need to do something to contain campaign spending. 274 Possibly, the idea has
begun to take hold that if governmental bodies in the United States are to function
democratically and in the public interest, campaign finance laws must be dramatically
reformed. Those who have reached that conclusion need only point to the state of
Wisconsin to prove their case.
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